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OIL AND GAS TAXATION*
BY JOHN F. HELLIWELL,** MARY E. MACGREGOR,***
ROBERT N. McRAE**** AND ANDRt PLOURDE*****

I. INTRODUCTION
The oil and gas industry has never been far from the centre
of attention whenever tax reform and tax changes have been under
consideration. At the time of the Royal Commission on Taxation,
the oil and gas industry was favourably treated under the federal
income tax system, and the main thrust of the Royal Commission's
proposals was to increase taxes in that industry towards the general
levels applicable to the rest of the business sector. As a result, the
oil and gas industry's arguments at that time took the form of
defending the preferential treatment accorded to it.
These
arguments were fairly effective in the political arena, so that when
oil and gas prices rose rapidly in the early 1970s, the federal
government received little revenue from the industry. These
problems were exacerbated by the costs of the federal subsidy to
imported oil, and by the sharp increases in provincial royalty rates,
both of which reduced net federal revenues from oil and natural gas.

* Copyright, 1988, John F. Helliwell, Mary E. MacGregor, Robert N. McRae & Andrd
Plourde.
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The subsequent series of federal tax changes in the 1970s
and early 1980s altered the federal tax treatment of oil and gas
revenues so markedly that industry arguments took the form of
asking for a tax system in which oil and gas revenues were subject
to the same tax regime that applied to other industries. In
particular, the federal tax system was tilted against the extractive
industries by the introduction, in 1974, of a concessionary lower rate
of corporation income tax for manufacturing and processing profits.
By the early 1980s, when the range and height of federal taxes on
oil and gas production were at their greatest, the equal tax treatment
fought by the industry in the aftermath of the Royal Commission
would have looked attractive. By the end of 1986, almost all of the
special federal taxes applicable to oil and gas revenues had been
removed, 1 and the industry was asking for the reintroduction of a
broadly based, earned depletion allowance as a means of helping
firms hard hit by the 1985-86 fall of world oil prices.
The purpose of this paper is to recount the main elements
of the pre-reform tax system, the Royal Commission proposals, and
the several regimes that have been in place since Carter. We shall
also attempt some quantitative assessment of alternative systems,
including their effects on the distribution of risks and revenues
among the industry, provincial governments, and the federal
government.
In addition, we will examine the consequences of variations
in oil and gas prices to the distribution of revenues and rents under
the approach to taxation proposed by the Royal Commission, and a
few alternatives. The ultimate objective here is to assess the
political and economic robustness of these taxation systems to
changes in world market conditions.
We shall also address a fundamental issue that was not even
discussed in the Royal Commission Report: the extent to which
changes in the tax system influence the ability of the oil and gas
industry to evaluate investment projects. The past fifteen years have
seen so many oil and gas tax regimes come and go that even
1

The major exceptions involve the treatment of offshore exploration, the resource
allowance to "compensate" for the non-deductibility of royalties, and the ability of the
consortium operating the Syncrude oil sands plant to deduct royalty payments for federal
income tax purposes.
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specialists lose track of what provisions were in place during which
years. It has been suggested that these rapid and often unpredictable changes in tax regimes have caused needless political
tensions, created an uncertain planning environment for oil and gas
producers, and led to an inefficient concentration of resources in
tax planning and in political activity aimed at changing the tax
system.
In addition, we will examine the consequences of variations
in oil and gas prices to the distribution of revenues and rents under
the approach to taxation proposed by the Royal Commission, and a
few alternatives. The ultimate objective here is to assess the political and economic robustness of these taxation systems 2 to changes
in world market conditions.
II. THE ROYAL COMMISSION'S APPROACH
The Royal Commission's approach to resource taxation in
general, and to the taxation of oil and gas in particular, was
consistent with its approach to overall tax reform. Indeed, it is one
of the strengths of any coherent and integrated approach to tax
reform that its principles can be generally applied, without the need
for a separate rationale and separate provisions for each industry,
type of organization, and class of income. The Royal Commission's
general approach to the taxation of income from business was to
treat all industries and types of organization as equally as possible.
Seen in this light, the main special provisions extended to resource
industries prior to 1967 were percentage depletion, 3 the three-year
tax-free period for new mines, and the accelerated write-off of
exploration and development expenditures. In volume four of the

21F. Helliwell et aL, Oil and Gas in Canada: The Effects of Domestic Policies and World

Events (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) contains a more complete description of
the federal elements of the various tax systems that have been proposed or applied to oil and

gas income and expenses since 1967.
3

Under the provisions of percentage depletion, firms were automatically allowed to deduct

a given percentage of oil and gas production profits (33 113 percent for operators and 25
percent for non-operators) when calculating taxable income.
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Commission's Report, and in the related study by Bucovetsky,4 the
pros and cons of these special provisions were considered at some
length. The percentage depletion provision was originally designed
to offset the non-deductibility of certain expenditures related to the
acquisition of mineral properties. By the time the Commission was
formed, all of the previously non-deductible expenses were fully
deductible,5 so the remaining case for the depletion allowance was
based on considerations of abnormally high risks entailing a higher
cost of capital. The Report took the view that the possibilities for
the spreading and diversification of risks were as great in the mining
and petroleum industries as elsewhere in the economy, and that any
tax-based disincentives to risk-taking should be addressed in a way
that is equally applicable to all industries and types of organization.
In particular, the Commission argued that if all gains were fully and
equally taxable, and all losses fully and immediately deductible, "there
would be little need for any special concessions to the mining and
petroleum industries even if it was felt that they were characterized
by greater risk than other industries."6 The main issues related to
the depletion allowance, and to the treatment of exploration and
development expenditures. The Commission went through the
various arguments based on regional development, the existence of
similar incentives in the United States, the special role of energy in
economic development, and the encouragement of domestic
ownership in the extractive industries, and concluded that
the need for special encouragement to mineral and petroleum exploration to
compensate for a capital market bias against risky ventures is small, if it exists at
all. We are also convinced that there are fiscal methods available that would be
as efficient as, or more efficient than, tax concessions in encouraging exploration
if this was deemed to be in the public interest.7

4

Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, The Taxation of Mineral Extraction by M.W.
Bucovetsky, Study No. 8 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1967).
5
The most important of these were expenditures to acquire land and production rights,
which became fully deductible from 10 April 1962.
6

Canada, Royal Commission on Taxation, Report, vol. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)
(Chair K. LeM. Carter) at 309 [hereinafter Report].
7

IbidL at 327.
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The Royal Commission's main proposals8 were that:
The depletion allowance should be withdrawn.
Exploration costs (including related depreciable assets) should
have a separate capital cost allowance class with a write-off rate
of 100 percent.
Development costs (including related depreciable assets) should
be included with exploration costs for a transitional period of five
to ten years and thereafter segregated in a separate class subject
to write-off at 20 to 30 percent on a diminishing balance.
The cost of acquiring properties should have a separate capital
cost class for each property, subject to a high transitional rate of
depreciation, but thereafter be written off at 10 to 20 percent of
the operating income from the property.
Losses on the sale of properties should be subject to the same
provisions as in other industries, and gains should be fully
taxable, also as in other industries.

III. THE WHITE PAPER AND BILL C-2599
In the four years between the release of the Royal
Commission's Report in late 1966 and the introduction of Bill C-259
embodying tax reform in 1971, there were many changes made to
the proposals. Responding to a combination of pressures from the
extractive industries and the governments of resource-rich provinces,
the Benson White Paper
recognized that the exploration for and development of mineral deposits continue
to provide special benefits to Canada and to various provinces by creating or
maintaining highly productive industry in areas other than those where rapid urban
and industrial growth are already occurring.... Just as scientific research and
development are believed to warrant some special public support, the government

feels that exploration for and development of minerals still warrant some support

8Ibid at 335-36.
9Bill C-259, An Act to Amcnd the Income Tax Act 3d Sess., 28th Part,1970-71.
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in a form more directly related to this activity than has been the case with past
depletion. It is believed that support on a less-generous scale should suffice for this
purpose.

The proposals contained in the White Paper can be
summarized as follows:
1. To retain immediate deductibility for all exploration and
development expenses against all income for those principally
involved in resource extraction, and against resource income for
others.
2. To retain full deductibility of the costs of acquiring mineral
properties (subject to the same "principal business" tests as for
exploration and development), but to treat gains from the sale
of such properties as capital gains, and hence taxable, under the
White Paper's general proposals for capital gains, at 50 percent
of their actual value.
3. For operators, the 33 1/3 percent depletion allowance would be
retained, but only if firms "earned" the rights to the allowance by
capital expenditures of $3 for every $1 of depletion allowance
claimed.
4. Percentage depletion for non-operators would be repealed.
In all major respects, the White Paper proposals treated oil
and gas production revenues more generously than did those of the
Royal Commission, but they too came under pressure from the
extractive industries, especially before hearings held by Committees
of the Senate and the House of Commons. In the course of
hundreds of briefs and scores of meetings on tax reform, the
Commons Finance Committee heard, once again, the arguments
favouring special incentives for the extractive industries, and phrased
their resulting dilemma as: "Is Canada prepared to suffer the
reduction in the growth and development of its
possibility of a ...

natural resource industries in exchange for the longer term benefits
of a more neutral and equitable tax system?"11
10

Hon. EJ. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposalsfor Tax Reform (Ottawa:
Printer, 1969) at 64.

Queen's

"!Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Trade and Economic
Affairs, EighteenthReport Respecting the White Paperon Tax Refonn (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1970) at 74.
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This dilemma is the inevitable consequence of advantageous
tax treatment for any industry or activity - that the removal of the
special treatment must generally lead to, at least the possibility of,
either short-term or long-lasting reductions in the pace of that
activity. Indeed, one of the primary justifications for the equal tax
treatment championed by the Royal Commission was the possibility
that there would be some redistribution of employment and
investment away from the tax-favoured sectors towards those
activities with a higher pre-tax return and with the potential, hence,
for making a greater overall contribution to economic well-being.
The usual result, at each stage of a reform process, is for the
original thrust and consistency of the reforms to be muted by
attempts to regain or retain the advantages originally available to the
favoured industries or activities. Thus it was predictable that the
Commons Finance Committee accepted the White Paper
modifications of the Royal Commission's proposals and even offered
some further expansion of incentives. This Committee suggested
that:
1. Some consideration be given to permitting tax-free transfer of
mineral rights between corporations (even though the cost of
these rights might have been written off previously against
taxable income), subject to safeguards against abuse.
2. The earned depletion base be broadened to include the cost of
all mineral properties and expenditures on processing equipment.
Tax reform finally appeared before the House of Commons as a
whole when Bill C-259 was introduced on 18 June 1971.12 With
respect to petroleum revenues and expenditures, the Bill followed
the White Paper fairly closely. The main elements were:
1. Earned depletion was adopted, with eligible expenditures
broadened to include expansion of milling capacity for mining
(including oil sands) but excluding depreciable property such as
production equipment and natural gas plants.
2. Percentage depletion was to remain in force until the end of
1976, with no reduction of the accumulation of eligible

12

Hon. EJ. Benson, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:

Finance, 18 June 1971).

Department of
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expenditures for earned depletion, based on all expenditures
incurred after 7 November 1969.
3. Exploration and development expenditures would both be written
off at 100 percent against all income for companies meeting
"principal business" tests. Other firms could write off these
expenditures at 20 percent of the unclaimed balance against any
income, or at 100 percent against their resource income.
4. The purchase and sale of oil and gas rights was to be left
unchanged, treated as fully deductible expenses and fully taxable
income.
By permitting full expensing of all exploration and
development expenditures, by extending percentage depletion to the
end of 1976, and by allowing all expenditures from 1969 to 1976 to
accumulate for the use of post-1976 earned depletion, Bill C-259
left substantially intact the pre-reform system applicable to oil and
natural gas revenues in the 1970s. The system put in place at that
time was first subjected to major change as a consequence of the
rapid rise of world oil prices in 1973-74.
IV.

TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1973-74 WORLD OIL
PRICE INCREASES

Starting in 1974, the pace of change in energy taxation and
regulation was so fast that only the main elements can be sketched
in this paper.1 3 In September 1973, a month before the start of the
Arab-Israeli war, the domestic crude oil price was frozen at $3.80
per barrel. The National Energy Board then began to regulate the
export price, and an export tax was levied on the difference between
these two prices. When the domestic wellhead price was raised, by
federal-provincial agreement, to $6.50 per barrel in March 1974, an
Oil Import Compensation Program was introduced to subsidize the
difference between the actual and regulated prices for imported oil
13

A full review of the chronology is available in A. Plourde, Oil and Gas in Canada: A

Chronolog of Important Developments, 1941-1986, PEAP Energy Study No. 86-5 (Toronto:

Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1986). The main stages of the regulation
and deregulation of Canadian crude oil prices and trade are described in M.E. MacGregor,
Regulating and Deregulating Canadian Crude Oil, PEAP Energy Study No. 86-4 (Toronto:

Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1986).
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and products. During that fall and winter, there were also several
increases in provincial taxes and royalties on both crude oil and
natural gas. The federal budget of May 197414 proposed a number
of tax increases on oil and gas revenues. However, the minority
Liberal government was defeated in a House of Commons vote on
this budget. The ensuing general election returned the Liberals to
power, this time in a majority position, and the November 1974
budget1 5 reintroduced, with some modifications, the main elements
of the May proposals. As enacted, the main tax changes were:
1. Provincial royalties were disallowed as an expense under the
federal corporation income tax. In return, an additional ten
points of provincial abatement (for oil and gas profits only) was
given on the new national income tax rate of 50 percent on oil
and gas profits. Of this 50 percent, 20 percent was considered
to be abated to the provinces, leaving the federal rate at 30
percent. The budget also proposed that the corporation income
tax rate applicable to petroleum production profits be reduced
to 28 percent in 1975, and to 25 percent in and after 1976.
2. Percentage depletion was to be replaced immediately by earned
depletion.
3. Earned depletion was to be subject to an upper limit of 25
percent of production profits, rather than the 33 1/3 percent
established by the June 1971 budget.
4. One hundred percent write-off was to be retained for exploration
expenditures, with a rate of 30 percent to be used for development expenditures, for which the definition was broadened to
16
include land expenditures.

14

Hon. J.N. Turner, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:
Finance, 6 May 1974).
15

Hon. J.N. Turner, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:
Finance, 18 November 1974).

Department of

Department of

16

This is similar to what was proposed by the Royal Commission, except that the

Commission proposals would have a lower rate of write-off for land expenditures and would
have linked that write-off to income from the property in question. In the May 1974 budget,
a 30 percent write-off rate had been proposed for both exploration and development

expenditures.
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The main purpose of these substantial changes was said to
be to prevent the erosion of the federal income tax base by the
recent substantial increases in provincial royalties. In his budget
speech of November 1974,17 the Minister of Finance explained the
underlying reasoning as follows:
I acknowledge that royalties in respect of property rights have traditionally been
deductible as a business expense. However, in tax reform we be an the process of
disallowing certain income tax royalties in the mineral field 18 and substituting
federal tax abatements. Today, it is evident that a royalty is no longer a royalty in
the traditional meaning of the word. There have emerged various provincial charges

that are thinly disguised income taxes.
Today provincial charges take many forms ... there are provincial charges
that are determined by price, profit and volume.... In fact, there are so many kinds
of provincial charges and claims that it would be virtually impossible to draft

workable legislation which could distinguish between bona tide royalties, traditionally
deductible, and other taxes and charges.

The federal budget of June 1975,19 which raised the
regulated oil price to $8 per barrel and established regulated pricing
for natural gas sold in central Canada, also made further changes in
the income tax arrangements for the taxation of oil and gas profits.
The key changes made at this time were:
1. Effective from 1 January 1976, the general rate of corporation
income tax was set at 46 percent, and the additional 15
percentage-point abatement for oil and gas profits was converted
to a 25 percent resource allowance on production income net of
operating expenditures and capital cost allowances.
2. An investment tax credit of 5 percent of eligible expenditures on
tangible assets was introduced, applicable to oil and gas
exploration and development activities, to be in effect between
June 1975 and June 1977.
The net effect of these budget changes was to lower the rate
of federal corporation income tax below the 30 percent established

17

Turner, supra, note 15 at 13.

18The reference was to mining profits taxes, which under Bill C-259 were no longer to
be deductible expenses for the federal corporation income tax.
19

Hon. J.N. Turner, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:

Finance, 23 June 1975).

Department of
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in the previous budget. The reduction was especially great for firms
20
making substantial investment expenditures.
The next federal budget, in June 1976,21 continued the new
tradition of using the budget as the occasion for announcing
increases in the regulated domestic prices of crude oil and natural
gas, and made the following modifications to energy taxation:
1. To encourage energy conservation, the budget proposed a twoyear write-off for certain energy-conserving capital expenditures
incurred between budget night and 1980. In addition, the federal
sales tax was removed on certain non-fossil-fuel energy
generators, such as solar furnaces, heat pumps, and wind-powered
generators.
2. For similar reasons, the budget proposed special excise taxes on
high-energy-consuming motor vehicles and motor-vehicle airconditioners.
3. Between June 1976 and June 1979, all taxpayers (and not just
"principal business" taxpayers) were to be permitted to deduct
100 percent of exploration expenditures against any other
income. This would come to be known as the "drilling funds"
deduction.
In the next federal budget, 22 the key energy-related measure
was the introduction of "superdepletion", to apply for three years,
until 31 March 1980. In addition to regular earned depletion,
exploration expenditures above $5 million per well could "earn" an
additional depletion allowance of 66 2/3 percent. The combination
of depletion and superdepletion meant that well expenditures above
$5 million gave rise to a 200 percent write-off, comprising the 100
percent immediate exploration write-off, the 33 1/3 percent earned
depletion allowance, and the 66 2/3 percent depletion allowance.
The combination of depletion allowances of this size with the
20The resource allowance is a reduction from taxable income rather than a tax
credit.
It differs from a change in the tax rate because its base is larger than the corporation income
tax base, especially for firms making substantial exploration and development expenditures.
21

Hon. D.S. Macdonald, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:

Department of

Finance, 25 May 1976).
22

Hon. D.S. Macdonald, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of

Finance, 31 March 1977).
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provision of the May 1976 budget that permitted anyone to obtain
the 100 percent exploration write-off meant that 200 percent of well
costs could be written off against resource income, or 166 2/3
percent against any other income. The growth in the number of
drilling funds subsequently made these write-offs available to many
individual taxpayers with tax rates above 50 percent, creating a
perverse form of negative taxation whereby a more costly well (to
do the same job) could make the investor better off, since the value
of the tax reductions exceeded the costs of the drilling. Under these
circumstances, it was not surprising that frontier wells became more
numerous and much more expensive.23
The next two federal budgets 24 aimed to reduce the effective
tax burden on marginal projects such as heavy oil upgrading, oil
In addition, the
sands plants, and enhanced oil recovery.25
November 1978 budget not only extended the drilling funds
deduction to the end of 1981, but it also indefinitely extended the
availability of the investment tax credit. At the same time, the
general rate of tax credit was raised from 5 percent to 7 percent
with higher rates for designated regions, including Saskatchewan and
the northern parts of Alberta and British Columbia.

23'For example, as a result of the 200-per-cent deduction now available, a taxpayer
subject to a combined federal and provincial marginal tax rate of 62 per cent receives tax
benefits of $124 for every $100 invested in the frontier." Hon. J.S. Crosbie, Minister of
Finance, Supplementary Information [on the Budget] (Ottawa:

Department of Finance, 11

December 1979) at 69.
24
Hon. J. Chrdtien, Minister of Finance, The Budget (Ottawa: Department of Finance,
10 April 1978); Hon. J. Chrdtien, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department
of Finance, 16 November 1978).
25

In August 1978, the federal government introduced a refinery levy on all oil refined in
Canada. This levy, often referred to as the 'Syncrude levy', was used to raise the funds
necessary to extend the world price to the output of the Syncrude oil sands plant when it
came on stream towards the end of August. In December 1974, the federal government had
guaranteed the Syncrude participants that the plant would receive the world price for its

output.
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V. THE SECOND WORLD OIL PRICE SHOCK, 1979-80

In early 1979, world oil prices began to rise rapidly once
again, starting another series of tense and difficult federal-provincial
negotiations about energy prices and taxes. In December of that
year, John Crosbie introduced the budget proposals of the new
Progressive Conservative government. 2 6 In the absence of an agreed
federal-provincial resolution of energy pricing and taxation issues,
some aspects of the energy proposals were deliberately vague, such
as the form of a proposed new tax intended to collect for the
federal government "roughly half of the returns from oil and gas
price increases that exceed $2.00 per barrel and 30 cents per
thousand cubic feet per year."27 The proposed energy price strategy
was to move Canadian prices for crude oil gradually towards 85
percent of the lesser of u.s. and international prices, and to let prices
for natural gas rise in concert with oil prices.
To encourage conservation, the budget also proposed to
replace the 7-cent per gallon excise tax on gasoline with a 25-cent
per gallon tax on all transportation fuels, to be partially offset by an
income-tested refundable energy tax credit in the personal income
tax. In addition, the budget proposed to extend superdepletion at
a much reduced rate (6 2/3 percent) to the end of 1980 and then
to let it expire. The write-off rate for the purchase prices of
Canadian oil and gas properties, which had been 30 percent, was to
be reduced to 10 percent. 28 However, the minority Progressive
Conservative government was defeated on the budget in the House
of Commons, principally as a result of opposition to the excise tax
on transportation fuels.

26

Hon. J.S. Crosbie, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa:

Department of

Finance, 11 December 1979).
27

1bid at 4.

28

This measure would be enacted in April 1980, by the new Liberal government. See

Hon. Al. MacEachen, Minister of Finance, Notice of Ways and Means Motion Relating to
Proposed Amendnents to the Income Tax Act (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 21 April

1980).
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After an election campaign that was heavily oriented to
energy issues, a majority Liberal government was elected, having
made promises to have a "Made in Canada" oil price and to increase
the Canadian ownership share of the petroleum industry. This
platform achieved heavy electoral support in central Canada, but
almost none in the western provinces. It was therefore not entirely
surprising that the next federal budget,2 9 presented jointly with the
National Energy Program (NEP) on 28 October 1980, contained
several controversial energy taxes. Not only had federal-provincial
negotiations been unsuccessful, but world oil prices had continued
to rise rapidly, while Canadian energy prices remained frozen.3 ° One
result of this was rapidly rising federal subsidy payments covering the
expenditures made necessary by the Oil Import Compensation
Program.
VI.

THE NATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAM
AFTERMATH

AND ITS

One of the centrepieces of the NEP was a schedule of "Made
in Canada" prices to be paid for different categories of crude oil,
being lowest for conventional oil, higher for tertiary recovery oil, and
highest for production from the oil sands.3 1 Domestic oil users
would pay a "blended price" designed to cover the average costs of
all domestic and imported oil used. This was to be achieved by the
establishment of a Petroleum Compensation Charge (,cc), an
expanded version of the Syncrude levy that would be designed to
finance the amounts by which the costs of synthetic oil, imported oil,
and tertiary recovery oil exceeded the cost of conventional oil.

29

Hon. AJ. MacEachen, Minister of Finance, The Budget (Ottawa:

Department of

Finance, 28 October 1980).
30

1n late 1978, the federal government and the governments of the producing provinces

agreed to cancel the increases in domestic oil and gas prices scheduled for 1 January 1979,

and no subsequent agreement had been achieved.
31
See Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, The NationalEnergy Program 1980 (Ottawa:
Supply & Services Canada, 1980). A more detailed analysis of these issues can be found in

MacGregor, supra, note 13.
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Canadian oil users would then pay the sum of the PCC and the
regulated price of conventional oil. Aside from the Pcc, itself a
quasi-tax, the main tax and subsidy elements of the NEP were as
follows:
1. A new Natural Gas and Gas Liquids Tax (NGGLT) was
introduced, starting at $0.30 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) and
rising to $0.75 per mcf by 1983. This tax was to be levied on all
gas and gas liquids produced in Canada.
2. A new Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was introduced,
at 8 percent of petroleum and natural gas revenues net of
operating costs. This new tax was not to be deductible from the
income base for the corporation income tax.
3. The NEP proposed to replace earned depletion allowances 32 with
a system of cash payments under the new Petroleum Incentive
Program (these payments were usually known as Pip grants).
These grants varied between exploration and development, varied
between exploration regions, and were higher for firms with
higher degrees of Canadian ownership. With the exception of
exploration activities on the Canada Lands, no Pip grants were
payable to firms with less than 50 percent Canadian ownership.
The maximum rate payable on provincial lands was 33 percent
for exploration by firms with more than 75 percent Canadian
ownership. On the Canada Lands, the maximum rate payable
was 80 percent for exploration by firms with more than 75
percent Canadian ownership. The Pip grants were not taxable,
but they correspondingly reduced the expenditure that could be
deducted from taxable income, used to earn depletion allowances,
or eligible for the investment tax credit. 33
4. The revenues from the continuing federal oil export tax were to
be shared equally with the producing provinces.

32

The main exceptions to this were exploration activities by corporations in frontier
regions (now called "Canada Lands"), and in non-conventional sources, including tertiary oil

projects and heavy oil upgraders. In these cases, earned depletion was to remain at 33 1/3
percent, with PIP grants also available. However, superdepletion had been allowed to expire
on 1 April 1980, as scheduled in the March 1977 budget introducing this form of exploration

incentive.
33

Some departures from these proposals emerged when the measures were enacted.
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5. There were a number of features relating to the ownership and
taxation of oil and gas rights in the Canada Lands. Most
important were:

-

a) the retroactive right granted to the Crown to acquire a 25
percent back-in interest, at accumulated cost, on any production
licence on the Canada Lands; and
b) the planned introduction of a separate profits-related royalty
system (the Progressive Incremental Royalty, or PIR) for
production on the Canada Lands.
6. The NEP also envisaged the imposition of a tax on oil products
to be used to finance government acquisitions of producing
companies. Such a levy, labelled the Canadian Ownership
Special Charge (cosc), was introduced in May 1981 with the aim
of covering the costs of Petro-Canada's acquisition of the
Canadian assets of Petrofina. It was set at $1.15 per barrel for
oil products and $0.15 per mcf for natural gas.
The reaction of the governments of the producing provinces to the
NEP was strongly negative. Two days after the introduction of the
NEP, the government of Alberta announced a series of phased
cutbacks of allowed conventional oil production and halted the
approval process for new oil sands plants. These measures, the
provincial government stated, would remain in effect until the sharp
differences in energy policy were resolved in a manner acceptable to
Alberta.3 4 The resulting stalemate lasted until 1 September 1981,
when a memorandum of agreement on oil and gas pricing and
taxation was signed by the Prime Minister of Canada and the
Premier of Alberta. 35 Similar agreements were subsequently signed
with British Columbia (on 24 September) and Saskatchewan (on 26
October). These three agreements were unusual for their detail and
the degree of commitment by both levels of government, each of
which agreed not to alter tax and royalty rates in any way that would
reduce aggregate revenues flowing to the other level of government

34

For a quantitative analysis of the NEP and the Alberta response, see J.F. Helliwell &

R.N. McRae, "The National Energy Conflict" (1981) 7 Can. Pub. Pol'y 15.
35

Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, Memorandum of Agreement between the

Government of Canada and the Government ofAlberta relatingto Energ' Pricing and Taration
(1 September 1981) [unpublished].
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or to the oil and gas producing industry. The agreements were
intended to last five years, until 31 December 1986.
The main features of these agreements were:
1. The pattern of regulated oil and gas prices was to be linked
more closely to world oil prices, with synthetic oil and "new" oil
(that is, crude oil produced from pools discovered after 1980)
getting the world price, while a price schedule limited to 75
percent of the cost of world oil would apply to "old" oil (that is,
crude oil produced from pools discovered before 1981). These
new prices were, on average, substantially higher than the NEP or
pre-NEP prices for both producers and consumers.36
2. The federal government agreed to drop the NGGLT on gas
exports, but proposed to raise the rate of this tax to make the
Toronto city-gate price of natural gas equal to 65 percent of the
delivered price of crude oil with an equal heating value.
3. The PGRT, originally 8 percent, was to be raised to 16 percent,
but a 25 percent resource allowance was introduced to reduce
the effective rate of PGRT to 12 percent.
4. The federal government was to introduce a new Incremental Oil
Revenue Tax (IoRT) equal to 50 percent of the incremental
revenues on old oil, where the incremental revenues were
defined by the difference between the conventional prices
established in the NEP and those in effect under the agreements.
Provincial royalties were deductible for the purpose of IoRT,
which was treated as a substitute for federal and provincial
corporation income taxes.
5. Within Alberta, the Pip was to be administered and paid for by
the provincial government, but left in the federal charge
elsewhere.
The net effect of the new taxes and higher prices was to
increase revenues, relative to the NEP, for the producing industry and
for both levels of governments. The new federal taxes envisaged by
the agreements were part of the federal budget of 12 November
36

For example, the 1982 wellhead price for new oil, net of all taxes and royalties, was
$7.10 per barrel under the NEP and $14.60 per barrel under the agreements. For a more
detailed quantitative analysis of the agreements, see J.F. Helliwell & R.N. McRae, "Resolving
the Energy Conflict: From the National Energy Program to the Energy Agreements" (1982)
8 Can. Pub. Poly 14.
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1981,3 7 and came into effect on 1 January 1982. However, world oil
prices had stopped rising, so that the agreement prices, which were
limited by world oil prices, soon fell below the "Made in Canada"
prices envisaged by the NEP. Thus the new taxes, the IORT, NGGLT,
and PGRT produced much less revenue than originally forecast. In
response to the stagnant world oil prices, the Alberta government
lowered royalty rates in April 1982, and the federal government
released an "update" to the NEP38 a few months later.
The overall intent of the Alberta changes was to increase
industry cash flows by $5 billion in the 1982-86 period covered by
the 1981 agreements, while the NEP update changes were expected
to add $2 billion to industry cash flows during the same period.
These two sets of changes were expected to offset slightly more
than fully the effects on the producing industry of the drop in actual
and expected oil prices between September 1981 and June 1982. 9
The main tax changes announced in the NEP update were:
1. The suspension of the IORT from 1 June 1982 to 1 June 1983.
This suspension was subsequently renewed until the tax was
removed entirely. Thus, the IORT was only in effect for the first
half of 1982.40

2. A reduction in the effective rate of PGRT from 12 to 11 percent
for a one-year period starting 1 June 1982.
3. The effective rate of PGRT for oil sands production was reduced
to 8 percent for a two-year period ending 31 December 1984.
4. A credit of $250,000 per year against PGRT payments was granted
to all producers with the aim of eliminating the tax entirely for
the smallest producers.

37

Hon. A.J. MacEachen, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of

Finance, 12 November 1981).
38

Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, T/he National Energy Program: Update 1982

(Ottawa: Supply & Services Canada, 1982).
39

These calculations are reported in J.F. Helliwell, M.E. MacGregor & A. Plourde, "The
National Energy Program Meets Falling World Oil Prices" (1983) 9 Can. Pub. Pol'y 284.
40

The IORT was levied on the production of the Suncor oil sands plant for a longer

period.
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The April 1983 budget41 renewed the IORT suspension for
another year and proposed to change the PGRT for tertiary oil
recovery projects so as to eliminate liabilities under the tax until all
capital costs from the projects were recovered. The indefinite
continuation of the cosc was also announced in this budget.
In the November 1984 Economic and FiscalStatement,42 the
lower rate of PGRT for oil sands production was extended, and there
was an increase in the small producers' credit against the PGRT. In
addition, it was announced that the narrowing gap between Canadian
and world oil prices had lessened the justification for subsidy
programmes designed to cut oil use by conservation or substitution,
and that such subsidies would be phased out or consolidated. The
Statement also foreshadowed changes designed to reduce and simplify
the extent of energy taxation and regulation, including the system of
Pip grants.
VII.

THE WESTERN ACCORD AND THE CURRENT TAX
SYSTEM

By the time the Western Accord43 was signed in March 1985
by the governments of Canada, Alberta, British Columbia, and
Saskatchewan, Canadian energy prices were at or close to world
levels, and the various special taxes and charges introduced as part
of the NEP were producing little revenue, with the exception of the
PGRT. Under the Western Accord, Pip grants and the PGRT were both
to be phased out, the IORT and the NGGLT were to be withdrawn

41

Hon. M. Lalonde, Minister of Finance, Budget Speech (Ottawa: Department of Finance,
19 April 1983).
42

Hon. M.H. Wilson, Minister of Finance, Economic and Fiscal Statement (Ottawa:

Department of Finance, 8 November 1984).
43

Canada, The Westem Accord - an agreement between the Governments of Canada,
Alberta, Saskatchewan and British Columbia on oil and gas pricing and taxation (28 March
1985) [unpublished].

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 No. 3

immediately, and deregulation was promised for both crude oil and
natural gas. 44
It was envisaged, and has been the case, that deregulation
would proceed faster and further for crude oil than for natural gas.
Moving to world prices for crude oil and oil products meant that the
Pcc, the oil export tax and the Oil Import Compensation Program
were all redundant, and were accordingly dismantled.4 s The tight
links between domestic and international oil prices, effected by
permitting almost unrestricted exports and imports of crude oil and
products, meant that the post-Accord reductions in world oil prices
drove down taxes and energy cash flows alike, and created
substantial pressure for accelerated removal of the PGRT. The
immediate elimination of the PGRT was announced, outside the
process, in September 1986, to be effective 1
normal budget
46
October.
principal remaining special features of oil
By early 1987, the
47
and gas taxation were:
1. The immediate write-off of exploration expenditures, a 30
percent write-off for development expenditures, and a 10 percent
write-off for land expenditures. All of these features are similar
to the proposals made by the Royal Commission.

44

Shortly after the Western Accord was signed, the government of Alberta announced a

reduction in oil and gas royalty rates. See Alberta, "Statement by Premier Lougheed and
Energy Minister Zaozirny on Oil and Gas Incentives" (24 June 1985) [unpublished].
45

For a quantitative examination of the potential impact of the Western Accord and
related developments, see J.F. Helliwell et al, "I'he Western Accord and Lower World Oil
Prices" (1986) 12 Can. Pub. Pol'y 341.
46

Shortly afterwards, the government of Alberta announced a reduction in oil and gas
royalty rates. See Alberta, "Oil and Gas Activity Incentives" (29 October 1986) [unpublished].
47

After the empirical work in this paper was completed, the federal government
announced a new oil and gas exploration incentives program. Basically, this program is
intended to provide grants for one-third of the exploration costs incurred anywhere in Canada,
up to an annual maximum of $10 million per firm. At the same time, the government
extended tax advantages to the oil and gas industry by allowing certain of its activities to be
financed through the issue of flow-through shares. (Such advantages had previously been
made available to the mining industry.) See, for example, K. Cox & C. Waddell, "Ottawa gift
to energy firms to cost $350 million a year" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (26 March 1987)
A1-A2.
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2. Royalties paid to provincial governments are non-deductible for
purposes of the federal corporation income tax. This nondeductibility is intended to be offset by the (federal) resource
allowance, which reduces resource income by 25 percent. The
offset is more or less than complete, depending on whether
royalty rates are less or more than 25 percent of production
income. 48 Hence, this special feature amounts to a federal
subsidy to oil and gas extraction whenever the provincial royalty
rates are below 25 percent.
3. The rate of corporation income tax is higher for oil and gas
extraction than for manufacturing and processing (including the
operation of gas processing plants).
4. Flow-through shares receive special tax treatment, and can be
used by the oil and gas, and mining industries to finance some
In addition, the federal oil and gas
of their activities.
development incentive is to be in effect until the end of 1989.
Aside from these issues of unequal treatment of industries,
which are likely to be addressed to some extent in the federal
government's 1987 tax reform proposals, there is the possibly more
important issue of the instability, over time, of the Canadian system
of taxation of production revenues from oil and gas. There have
been very large and rapid swings in the rates and structure of
taxation, ranging from subsidies exceeding 100 percent of costs in the
high-flying days of superdepletion, to marginal tax rates reaching 100
percent during some of the federal-provincial struggles for larger
shares of revenues when oil prices were rising rapidly in the
aftermath of the 1973-74 and 1979-80 world oil price shocks.
How can the consequences of the changes be assessed? In
principle, it is likely that a rapidly changing system would act to
increase investor uncertainty and thus reduce the attractiveness of
oil and gas investments. However, it is also possible that the
changes in the level and structure of oil and gas taxation have served
to make actual net-of-tax revenues less variable and more predictable
than they would have been in the absence of these changes. This
latter outcome is perhaps less likely in recent Canadian history, when
the major changes have been triggered by competition for revenue

48

The details of the resource allowance are described in Helliwell et al, supra, note 2.
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shares more than by any intent to stabilize net industry returns.
Some rough empirical judgments about this issue can be made by
comparing the rates of return and their variability under the
historical regime of fast-changing rules with those that would have
obtained under several alternative and more stable tax regimes.

VIII.

EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE OIL AND GAS
TAXATION SYSTEMS

In this Part, we use results from alternative simulations of the
MACE model of the Canadian economy 9 to compare the
consequences of five main policy regimes during the 1974-1990
period:
1. The historical pattern of changing tax structures and rates with
the historical pricing policies ("historical prices and taxation
policies" or "HISTORY" in the text, tables, and figures).
2. The historical pattern of changing tax structures and rates with
unregulated crude oil and natural gas prices ("deregulation" or
"DEREG").

3. The tax system and royalty rates that were in place before oil
prices and royalty rates started to rise in 1973-74 ("the prereform system" or "PREREF").
4. The royalty rates that were in place before 1973, coupled with
the income tax system recommended by the Royal Commission
on Taxation ("the Royal Commission proposals" or "cOMMIs").

5. The current tax regime, which has somewhat higher royalty rates
than in the early 1970s. Royalties are non-deductible for federal
income tax purposes, but there is a resource allowance ("the
current system" or "CURRENT").
In all cases, we make the assessments using the historical
pattern of world oil prices; and in all cases except the historical one
(HISTORY), we assume that Canadian oil and natural gas prices were
unregulated and therefore rose and fell in concert with the
movements in world prices. Even in our analysis of the historical
49

The version of the MACE model used in this paper is described in J.F. Helliwell et al.,

"Supply oriented Macroeconomics: The MACE model of Canada," 4 Econ. Modelling 318.
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system, we compare the historical results with what they would have
been had domestic energy prices been unregulated (DEREG). This
helps to show the relative importance of price regulation and tax
changes in determining the changing size and distribution of energy
revenues.
The main point of our assessment is to see to what extent
the historical pattern of complex energy taxes and regulations
sheltered Canadian energy users and producers from changes in
world markets and to assess the extent to which the distribution of
energy revenues, energy industry activity, and energy demand would
have been different under any of the alternative systems under
review.
A. HistoricalPrices and Taxation Policies (HISTORY)
The pattern of regulated prices and tax changes that evolved
during the 1970s and early 1980s was in large part a response to a
rapidly changing world oil market. Regulated domestic prices
insulated both Canadian consumers and producers from the full
impact of changes in world oil prices. Despite this insulation,
Canadian energy prices, in general, still rose more rapidly than the
overall price level in the economy. Domestic requirements for crude
oil generally declined while the demand for natural gas increased.
Real investment in the energy industry more than doubled between
1974 and 1985,50 and net government energy revenues, particularly
those from the upstream oil and gas industry, increased steadily.
Although part of the rise in government revenues is due to
increases in the wellhead prices of crude oil and natural gas, a large
part is attributable to increases in provincial royalty rates and the
introduction by the federal government of special industry taxes or
tax provisions when world oil prices were rising rapidly. The average
wellhead price of crude oil, for example, increased sixfold between
1974 and 1985, while the after-tax prices received by producers for

50

For a more detailed discussion of investment trends in the Canadian oil and gas

industry during this period, see M.E. MacGregor & A Plourde, Investment Trends and
Changing Policies in the Canadian Oil and Gas Industry, PEAP Energy Study No. 86-4

(Toronto: Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1987).
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new oil increased by a factor of five. As Figure 1 shows,51 rates of
return for the industry increased from around 10 percent in 1974
to a maximum of just over 14 percent in 1980. Rates of return
increased sharply in the early'1980s with the introduction of worldequivalent pricing on new oil production, but this was more than
offset by the decreased rate of return on natural gas production.
The combined rate of return fell sharply in 1986 with the drop in
world oil prices from around u.s. $27 per barrel in 1985 to u.s. $15
per barrel in 1986. We have assumed that the recovery apparent in
world oil prices at the beginning of 1987 will be sustained, 52 and
this accounts for the gradual recovery in the overall rates of return
to around 8 percent, which is still below the levels prevailing during
the 1970s.
Rates of Return for Oil, Gas and Combined under HISTORY
(percent)

Legend
A OIL
X GAS
[] COMBINED

Year

Figure 1
51
52

Note that "Oil" excludes oil sands production, while "Combined" includes it.

In our projection period, we assume that 1987 world oil prices will average U.S. $18
per barrel and that they will grow at the U.S. rate of inflation thereafter. We also assume
that domestic natural gas prices will be equal to 85 percent of the btu-parity oil price starting
in 1987.
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Figure 2 provides an indication of how the net economic benefits
from Canadian crude oil and natural gas production are distributed
among producers, consumers, and governments, under historical
pricing and taxation policies. These annual flows have been
converted to 1971 dollars in order to facilitate year-to-year (and
later, case-to-case) comparisons 5 3 As is evident from Figure 2,
consumers and the provincial governments tended to reap most of
the economic benefit from oil and natural gas production during the
1970s. The federal government received the least benefit, partly
because of the subsidy payments to crude oil importers. Consumer
rents fell sharply after 1980 (and federal rents rose) as domestic
prices approached world levels and consumers began to bear the
costs of the subsidy programme. Rents to the federal government
also rose during the early 1980s with the introduction of a number
of special taxes on the industry.
B. Deregulation (DEREG)
In our deregulation case, we assume that all domestically
produced oil receives the equivalent of the world price and that the
delivered price of natural gas in eastern Canada is equal to 85
percent of the btu-equivalent, delivered oil price. While our oil
price assumptions are not controversial, our assumptions about
natural gas prices under deregulation are of a more heroic nature.
Given the highly regulated nature of the natural gas market, the
past swings from expected shortfalls to large surpluses, and the
uncertainty about the impact of deregulation in the future, our
assumptions about what deregulation would have meant in past

53

Economic rents to consumers ("CONS" in the figures) are the compensated consumer
surpluses accruing between domestic and world prices. Producer rents ("PROD') are equal
to wellhead revenues net of operating costs, all taxes and royalties, land payments, economic
depreciation, and an after-tax charge on unamortized capital. Rents to provincial governments
('PROV") are equal to revenues from income taxes, royalties, land payments, and the equity
interest in Syncrude net of incentive payments, royalty abatements, and a real tax opportunity
cost of about 1 percent of invested capital. Rents to the federal government ('FED') are
defined as the sum of income and other taxes on the oil and gas industry, consumer taxes on
oil and natural gas, less subsidy and incentive payments and a real tax opportunity cost of

about 2 percent of invested capital.
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should be viewed mainly as illustrative of how a market-sensitive
pricing system might have functioned.

Flow Rents from Oil and Gas under HISTORY
(billions of 1971 dollars)

A

Legend
CONS

X
-

CONS+ FED
CONS + FED + PROV

0

CONS + FED + PROV + PROD

Year

Figure 2

In this case we assume that, except for prices, everything
would have remained the same as in our historical base case. By
assuming that taxes, royalty rates, export volumes, and other policies
are unchanged, we can separate the effects of historical pricing
policies from the many changes in taxes and royalties that
accompanied price regulation. This will later allow us to compare
the effects of the historical pattern of tax changes with several more
stable regimes in order to assess how they contributed to or
subtracted from the stability of industry revenues and investment.
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The most obvious outcome of our deregulated pricing system
is the higher prices producers would have received for both oil and
natural gas during the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s.
Average wellhead prices for crude oil would have been anywhere
from 6 to 114 percent higher, while5 natural
gas prices would have
4
been from 12 to 128 percent higher.
In our model, changes in oil and natural gas investment are
driven by changes in the ratio of the after-tax price to the after-tax
costs of finding, developing, and producing new reserves. As is
evident from Figures 3 and 4, the increases in producer prices
outweigh the increases in producer-borne costs under deregulation;
so that oil and gas investment, discoveries, and, indeed, the ultimate
stock of recoverable reserves all would have been much higher.
Real energy investment would have been around 4.2 percent higher
on average between 1974 and 1985, although after 1981, when new
oil began receiving the world-equivalent price, the differences are
small. 55
Although higher wellhead prices result in increased
investment and productive capacity for both oil and natural gas,
production levels tend to be lower because of the effects of the
higher prices on consumer demand for oil and natural gas. Overall
energy prices to consumers are up by 19 percent on average over
the 1974 to 1985 period, and at the peak of world prices in 1980,
they are 45 percent higher than under historical prices and policies.
Canadian crude oil requirements are down an average of 5 percent
(reducing oil imports by nearly 20 percent), and the demand for
natural gas is down an average of 22 percent.
For many of the years under consideration, consumers are
clearly worse off in our deregulation case. What of producers and
governments? Revenues to both increase as a result of deregulation,

54The differences in oil prices are strictly a function of how far domestic prices were
below world levels and the resulting differences in the exchange rate. Natural gas prices,
however, are a function of both changes in the btu-parity pricing rule and higher oil prices.

Lower btu-parity pricing rules were in effect prior to 1976 and after 1980, when the NEP and
1981 agreements lowered the btu-parity ratio from 85 to 65 percent.
55

Energy-sector investment is actually somewhat lower after 1981 under deregulation,

since the method used to calculate the world-equivalent price under the administered pricing
system tended to overestimate market values.
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but have net economic rents also increased? Figure 5 shows the
changes in flow rents to producers, consumers, and the federal and
provincial governments. Obviously, deregulation results in a shift in
the net economic benefits from oil and gas consumers to producers
and governments.
Ratio of After-tax Prices to After-tax Costs - Oil

Legend
A HISTORY

0.5

X

E5

DEREG
PREREF

[] COMMIS
XXCURRENT

Figure 3

The overall impact of deregulation on real GNP is negative,
despite the boost given to energy-sector investment and the positive
impact on government balances (see Table 1). Deregulation results
in strong increases in the economy-wide inflation rate during the two
OPEC price shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80, although the price level
gradually returns to base-case levels following the shocks. The
increase in the cost of a factor of production (that is, energy),
however, reduces output in the non-energy sector. Higher domestic
prices also reduce the competitiveness of Canadian output in both
export and domestic markets, so that the overall current account
deteriorates despite the improvement in the energy trade balance.
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Now that we have briefly discussed the likely implications of
the regulated pricing system that was in place prior to the Western
Accord of 1985, we turn to an examination of the effects of the tax
changes that were made over the years. We compare the historical
pattern of tax changes to three more stable alternatives,
assuming
56
cases.
four
all
in
system
pricing
the same deregulated
C. The Pre-Reform System

(P1REREF)

This alternative is, essentially, the system that was in place
before tax reform was introduced in 1971, which we refer to as the
pre-reform system. Non-tangible exploration and development
expenditures and land acquisition costs are all fully deductible in the
year in which they are incurred. Provincial royalties are equal to
16 2/3 percent on all production, and are fully deductible for the
purposes of both federal and provincial income taxes. In addition,
resource profits are subject to a 33 1/3 percent depletion allowance,
a provision that effectively reduces the effective corporate income
tax rates by one-third. Since we are interested primarily in the
effects of specific oil and gas measures, we have maintained the
historical pattern of corporate tax changes that are not specific to
the oil and gas sector (that is, the investment tax credit, the halfyear capital cost allowance, and general corporation income tax
rates) 5 7 None of the special industry taxes introduced later in the
NEP or the 1981 agreements are in effect.
The combination of percentage depletion and lower, fully
deductible provincial royalties results in extremely large increases in
the after-tax prices received by producers. After-tax prices for new
production come close to doubling for both and natural gas under
the pre-reform system, compared with deregulation alone. Removing
the PGRT substantially increases the after-tax producer prices in the
early 1980s: after-tax prices increase by around 14 percent during

56

1n the following three sections, impacts will thus be measured as deviations from the

results obtained under our deregulation case.
57

The exception here is in 1974 and 1975, when the federal corporation income tax rate

for oil and gas was changed to that prevailing in the rest of the corporate sector.
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the period when the PGRT is in effect, as compared with just under
70 percent prior to the introduction of the PGRT.
The 1980-dollar values of capital and operating costs also
show increases of 25 to 30 percent, however, moderating the impact
of the rise in after-tax prices. Increasing the volume of discoveries
increases the costs of finding new reserves, since, in our model, the
marginal costs of new reserves increase with cumulative discoveries
because of depletion effects.
The other, and perhaps more
important, factor in the increase in the after-tax costs is the fact that
the value of the investment tax deductions is reduced under this set
of policies. The provisions for depletion are no longer tied to the
level of investment. Rather, percentage depletion merely reduces
the effective tax rate. The lower statutory tax rate also reduces the
value of tax write-offs in general. Despite the increases in after-tax
costs in this case, the ratio of after-tax prices to costs shows a
substantial increase compared with deregulation alone, especially
during the early years (see Figures 3 and 4).
Real energy
investment is increased by almost 12 percent, between 1974 and
1985, as a result of the increases in oil and gas investment.
Not surprisingly, net government revenues from oil and gas
are down compared with deregulation alone, although for the most
part the increase brought about by the higher prices under
deregulation still means that net government revenues are higher
than in the historical pricing and taxation case. The pre-reform
taxation system, basically, effects a transfer of rents from both levels
of government to producers (Figure 6). The provincial governments
tend to lose the most with oil, and the federal government tends to
lose more with natural gas.58 Consumer rents are almost unaffected,
compared with deregulation alone, but increase slightly after 1980
with the removal of the Canadian Ownership Special Charge.
After 1985, however, producers tend to do worse under the
pre-reform system than under deregulation alone, while provincial
governments do better. Under the pre-reform system, producers
invest more than they would have under the historical tax system
(even with deregulated prices), so that when world oil prices fall in

58This is because average royalty rates tended to be higher for oil than natural gas under

historical policies.

484

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 No. 3

1986, they are holding greater stocks of reserves and face a higher
opportunity cost of doing so. The provincial governments, on the
other hand, benefit from higher income tax revenues, owing to the
elimination of the royalty tax credit (which was increased in 1985)
and to generally higher production levels. Higher after-tax prices
for producers also result in higher land payments under the prereform system.59 In addition, royalty revenues are lower under the
pre-reform system than under deregulation, but after 1984 the
differences become less pronounced.
This is because the
deregulation case incorporates the effects of the 1985 and 1986
reductions in provincial royalty rates, so that by the end of the
simulation period these rates are much closer to the constant royalty
rates prevailing in the pre-reform system.
Ratio of After-tax Prices to After-tax Costs - Gas
2.5

Legend
0.5

A HISTORY
X DEREG
E] PREREF
ED COMMIS
XCURRENT

'

Year

Figure 4
59

In the flow rent equations, land payments are written off as reserves are produced, and
unit land costs are expressed as the unamortized stock of land payments per unit of current
production. Since land payments increase proportionately more than production in the prereform case, the unamortized stock of land payments per unit of current production is much
larger.
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Changes in Flow Rents from Oil and Gas under DEREG
(Level differences from HISTORY in billions of 1971 dollars)
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Figure 5
Changes in Flow Rents from Oil and Gas under PREREF
(Level differences from DEREG in billions of 1971 dollars)
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The strong increases in energy-sector investment under the
pre-reform system result in significant increases in real GNP when
compared with deregulation alone (see Table 2), increases that for
the most part, however, are not enough to offset the negative impact
of deregulation. The energy-sector investment boom also increases
the inflation rate in the economy, which eventually reduces Canadian
exports and has a negative impact on the overall trade balance.
Since higher activity levels in the economy also increase the demand
for oil and natural gas, the deterioration in the non-energy trade
balance is not offset by lower oil imports, as it was in the previous
case.
D.

The Royal Commission Proposals (coMMIs)

In this simulation, we assume that the system proposed by
the Royal Commission would have been implemented by 1974.
Provincial royalties are still 16 2/3 percent on all production and
fully deductible for income tax purposes, but depletion has been
eliminated completely (earned or percentage), non-tangible
development expenditures are written off at 30 percent per year
instead of 100 percent, and land costs are written off at 10
percent6c In the spirit of the Royal Commission's efforts to design
a neutral tax system, we have also set the investment tax credit rate
at zero. The impact of this is moderated by the fact that it applies
only to tangible investment expenditures, and these make up about
40 percent of total investment for natural gas and about 20 percent
for oil.
As is immediately evident from Figures 2 and 3, the Royal
Commission proposals have a smaller impact on the ratio of aftertax prices to after-tax costs than the pre-reform system has. Here
the increases in after-tax producer prices are only about one-half
those of PREREF, because of the loss of percentage depletion. Aftertax costs for new production are greater than in the deregulation
case, but less than under the pre-reform system. The loss of the
investment tax credit and the earned depletion allowance reduces the
write-off and credits available to producers but, on the other hand,

6

oNote that exploration expenditures are still expensible.
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the higher statutory tax rates enhance the value of the write-offs
that do exist. The latter is the main reason why the after-tax costs
are lower under the Royal Commission proposals than under the
pre-reform system. Increases in real energy-sector investment
average 10.6 percent during the 1974 to 1985 period, compared with
12 percent in the previous case, and the positive impact on real GNP
is only about 80 percent of what it was with the pre-reform system,
which is not enough to offset the negative impact of deregulation
(Table 2).
Prior to 1986, the flow rents to both oil and gas producers
increase with the Royal Commission proposals (Figure 7), but by
much less than in the previous case. This time producer rents
increase mainly at the expense of the provincial governments, since
rents to the federal government increase slightly on crude oil and
remain more or less the same for natural gas. After 1985, flow rents
to producers decrease while rents to the provincial governments
increase relative to deregulation alone. However, the changes are
not as large as in the pre-reform case, since the impact of the Royal
Commission proposals on investment and land payments is smaller.
Changes in Flow Rents from Oil and Gas under COMMIS
(Level differences from DEREG in billions of 1971 dollars)
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Changes in Flow Rents from Oil and Gas under CURRENT
(Level differences from DEREG in billions of 1971 dollars)
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Figure 8

E. The Cur'ent System (CURRENT)
In many respects, the current taxation system is remarkably
similar to the one proposed by the Royal Commission: No depletion
allowance, earned or otherwise; 61 land expenditures written off at 10
percent, non-tangible development expenditures at 30 percent,
expenditures at 100 percent. The main differences between the
current system and the preceding simulation are that, here ,provincial
royalties are somewhat higher 62 and not deductible for the purposes
of federal income tax. In place of royalty deductibility, there is a
federal resource allowance equal to 25 percent of resource income.
We have also included the increases in the federal excise tax that
accompanied the implementation of the Western Accord.
61

In the flow rent equations, land payments are written off as reserves are produced, and

unit land costs are expressed as the unamortized stock of land payments per unit of current
production. Since land payments increase proportionately more than production in the prereform case, the unamortized stock of land payments per unit of current production is much
larger.
62

Note that exploration expenditures are still expensible.
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If the current royalty and taxation system had been in effect
in 1974, after-tax prices to producers would have been larger than
under the deregulated system with the historical tax policies, but by
somewhat less than under the Royal Commission proposals because
of higher and non-deductible provincial royalties. Increases in aftertax costs would have been somewhat larger than under the Royal
Commission proposals, because the resource allowance reduces the
tax rate applicable to oil and gas income and therefore reduces the
value of the tax write-offs. The increases in real energy-sector
investment, therefore, are more moderate than in either of the
previous two systems, as are the positive impacts on real GNP (see
Table 2). As Figure 8 suggests, the current policies would have
increased rents flowing to producers during the initial part of the
simulation, mainly because of the lower royalty rates in effect. After
1985, royalty rates are roughly the same in this simulation and the
deregulation case, but production levels are higher (particularly for
oil) and result in an increase in provincial royalty revenues. This is
sufficient to ensure that provincial rents increase slightly more after
1986 under the current system than under the Royal Commission
proposals, even though the impact on investment and land payments
is somewhat lower. Rents to the federal government would also
have increased, because of the elimination of earned depletion and
the earlier introduction of the excise tax on motive fuels, a move
that substantially reduces consumer rents and also increases the
inflation rate in the economy during the early period.
IX. TAXATION AND RISK-SHARING
The final issue that we shall address is the extent to which
instability in the tax system contributed to instability in the operating
environment for the industry. Table 3 shows the average rates of
return for conventional crude oil, natural gas, and the two combined,
over the 1974 to 1985 period and the 1974 to 1990 period, along
with the standard deviations for each period. The historical pattern
of prices and policies consistently gives the lowest average after-tax
rate of return, while the pre-reform system gives the highest. The
Royal Commission proposals and the current system tend to yield
similar results.
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One of the more interesting features of these results is that
the stable taxation policies tend to provide the most variable rates
of return for the industry. This is particularly true for the prereform system. Part of the increase in variability is due to the
higher variability in returns when the full impact of the changes in
world oil prices flows through to the producers. The pre-reform
system, which had the lowest marginal tax rates and provided the
largest pass-through of changes in world prices, gave the highest
investment responses and the most variable rates of return. It also
yielded the lowest rates of return in the period after 1983 (this is
even more true of the post-1985 period) when world oil prices began
to fall. The other systems, which slowed down the investment
responses during the boom time of 1979-81, yield higher rates of
return after the slump in 1986. The historical pattern of prices and
taxes had the lowest level of investment, and therefore the highest
rate of return following the price collapse in 1986.
Table 3
Average Rates of Return Under Alternative
Taxation and Pricing Systems
HISTORY

DEREG

PREREF

COMMIS

CURRENT

OIL'
1974-85
1974-90

11.8 (3.5)
12.0 (3.0)

15.7 (5.0)
14.5 (4.5)

21.8 (5.2)
18.1 (7.3)

18.3 (3.1)
15.8 (4.7)

17.9 (2.9)
15.6 (4.4)

GAS
1974-85
1974-90

10.5 (2.9)
9.5 (2.8)

12.0 (4.1)
10.3 (4.4)

15.7 (9.1)
12.1 (9.4)

12.6 (4.7)
10.4 (5.3)

12.6 (4.6)
10.3 (5.3)

OIL AND GAS 2
1974-85
1974-90

11.7 (1.5)
10.6 (2.2)

13.4 (3.0)
11.5 (3.9)

17.8 (7.5)
14.0 (8.7)

14.8 (3.9)
12.3 (5.2)

14.8 (3.8)
12.2 (5.2)

Note: Numbers in brackets are standard deviations.
I Excludes oil sands plants.
2 Includes oil sands plants.
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This result does not mean that a constantly changing tax
policy provides the most certain environment for investment
planning, but it does illustrate that investor uncertainties about
future tax policies may in part offset the uncertainties caused by the
variability of future prices for oil and gas. This will be so if the
general pattern of the changes is to raise tax rates when prices are
high and to lower them when prices are low. In our model,
investors are assumed to respond directly to current after-tax prices
and costs when making their current investment decisions. This is
no doubt oversimplified, as wise investment planners are not likely
to alter their plans as drastically as suggested by this in response to
what may be temporary changes in prices and tax rates. However,
it is probably true, as indicated by, among other things, the big cycles
in the bid prices paid for drilling rights sold at auction, that the
cycles of optimism and pessimism about net returns exaggerate the
effects that current prices will in fact have on the present value of
revenues from oil and gas wells63with production lives extending thirty
or more years into the future.
Changing tax policies impose another cost that is difficult to
quantify: if tax policies are thought to be subject to change under
political pressure, then it becomes rational for industries to invest
substantial resources in political efforts designed to improve the
position of their own industry or activity in relation to other
industries and activities. From the point of view of the system as a
whole, however, the political volatility of the tax system imposes a
real cost - since the efforts of each taxpayer group to increase its
own benefits require real resources - and offers the prospect of a
tax system that has substantial non-neutralities that lower the
efficiency with which the nation's resources are allocated among
alternative industries and activities.
Our results do seem to show that the taxation system, as it
evolved in response to changing external conditions, increasing the
63

The short horizon for expectations and, hence, the over-response to current policies,
events, and market conditions, may be due in part to similar behaviour on the part of
institutional investors. Evidence on the myopia of share-market expectations may be found
in RJ. Shiller, "Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to be Justified by Subsequent Changes in
Dividends?" (1981) 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 421; S. Nickell & S. Wadwani, Myopia, the 'Dividend
Puzzle' and Share Prices, Discussion Paper 155 (London, Eng.: Centre for Economic Policy
Research, 1987).
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tax burden in the boom times and backing off when times got rough,
served to dampen the investment swings that are perhaps the
inevitable consequence of a highly volatile world market. There is
also no doubt that without the collapse in world prices in 1986, the
historical policies that retarded investment would not have looked
nearly as attractive as they do today.
One of the secondary benefits of the equal tax treatment
proposed by the Royal Commission was that if it were generally
applied then it would affect the ground rules for political activity
designed to change the tax system. In particular, if everyone
recognized that such a tax system provided general advantages, and
was generally acceptable to all, then political activity designed to
introduce special provisions favouring a particular activity or industry
would have less likelihood of success and would be less likely to be
undertaken.
Our results, and the history of oil and gas taxation in
Canada, show that there is another important element to this issue
that comes to the fore when an industry operates in an environment
of uncertain and highly variable prices. In these circumstances, a tax
system, to be politically viable, must produce a distribution of
revenues that is perceived to be fair, not just on average across a
thirty-year horizon, but for a much shorter period. In Canada, as in
most countries, the oil and gas taxation systems that were designed
and applied in an environment of oil at less than u.s. $3 per barrel
were not sustainable with oil at u.s. $30 per barrel, while the systems
brought in with oil at u.s. $30 per barrel generally required many
changes when oil prices dropped to u.s. $10 or u.s. $15 per barrel.
In a federal structure of government with resource ownership
in the hands of the provinces, it is probably more efficient if the
federal tax structure is kept as nearly equal as possible between
industries, with the political viability and return-stabilizing features
of the tax and royalty system being designed and implemented by the
provincial governments, in the case of resources located in lands
under provincial jurisdiction. If the resulting inter-regional variations
in tax and activity levels pose political and efficiency problems, as
they have done almost continuously in the Canadian context, then
the remedy is probably better found in more robust systems for
general fiscal equalization, and not by industry-specific tax provisions.
These issues lay largely beyond the concerns of the Royal Commis-
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sion on Taxation in its studies twenty years ago, but they have been
brought to the fore by the subsequent large and unpredicted changes
in the prices of oil and gas and are likely to require attention in any
future reforms of oil and gas taxation.

